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Abstract 
Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective 
policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light 
on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner 
interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European 
Parliament (2009-2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up 
self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in 
the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition 
for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a third-
party arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, 
as suggested by principal-agent theory. 
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This study examines the selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP), 
who serve as their party groups’ primary negotiators of particular legislative proposals, making 
them highly consequential political actors with disproportionate influence over the content of 
legislation. Despite their important role, however, little is known about the allocation of 
shadow rapporteurships. We demonstrate, using both quantitative and qualitative data, that 
shadow rapporteurs are not selected in a top-down process by the party group leadership; 
instead, shadow rapporteurships are allocated primarily through a bottom-up process in which 
members of the EP (MEPs) self-select to become shadow rapporteurs.  
Each legislative proposal drafted by the European Commission is assigned a rapporteur 
in the EP’s lead committee, who drafts its official report of proposed amendments, shepherds 
the legislation through the law-making process, and serves as Parliament’s main negotiator in 
inter-institutional bargaining. Rapporteurs are selected in an ‘auction’ in which the leaders of 
each party group in the responsible committee (who are called coordinators) bid on reports 
using ‘points’ they receive according to the proportion of seats they hold, meaning that only 
one EP party group can secure a rapporteurship. To avoid having a single partisan actor 
dominate the legislative process, the other party groups may select one of their own to monitor 
the work of the rapporteur and negotiate on their behalf. Together with the rapporteur, these 
shadow rapporteurs ‘practically constitute informal sub-committees’ (Corbett et al., 2011: 159) 
that take the lead in negotiating particular pieces of legislation in the responsible EP committee. 
As such, they have the capacity to influence decision-making inside their party groups, the 
inter-party negotiations on the content of the collective position of the EP, and the EP’s inter-
institutional bargaining process with the Council of Ministers. 
Existing research recognises and highlights the influence of shadow rapporteurs in EU 
law-making. Jensen and Winzen (2012) show that rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs form the 
core of a highly hierarchical cooperation network in the EP. Ripoll Servant and Panning (2019) 
demonstrate how meetings of the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs are instrumental in 
developing and negotiating their EP committees’ positions. Judge and Earnshaw (2011) reveal 
how a coalition of shadow rapporteurs side-lined a recalcitrant rapporteur in inter-institutional 
negotiations with the Council. Ringe (2010) shows that rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs 
not only decisively influence the substance of legislation; they also shape their party 
colleagues’ voting behaviour by framing its content and consequences. Hence, it is no surprise 
that shadow rapporteurs are recognised by the Council Presidency as important contacts to 
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pursue and utilise in the EU legislative process (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015: 
1156) and that observers of EP politics recognise them as prominent actors with significant 
sway over policy outcomes (e.g., Hurka et al., 2015). 
Despite the influence of shadow rapporteurs in the EP’s policy-making process, we 
know little about how they are selected. While the role of rapporteurs in EU law-making (e.g., 
Benedetto, 2005; Costello and Thomson, 2011; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003) and their 
selection (e.g., Daniel, 2015; Hermansen, 2018; Kaeding, 2004; Yordanova, 2011; Yoshinaka, 
et al. 2010) have been recurring subjects in previous research, a lack of readily quantifiable 
data has, until recently, precluded similar analysis of how shadow rapporteurships are 
allocated. A careful investigation is thus warranted. 
We examine whether the process of choosing shadow rapporteurs is a top-down 
assignment process or a bottom-up process of self-selection. Regarding the former, we apply a 
principal-agent framework to explicate the delegation logic of distributing shadow 
rapporteurships. The hypotheses we derive reflect the concern of party leaders about the 
faithful representation of their policy views as well as their interest in the effective oversight 
and extraction of concessions from the lead rapporteur. With respect to a bottom-up selection 
process, we theorise the motivations of parliamentarians to promote their policy interests and 
re-election chances within and outside the EP. MEPs would thus self-select to cover legislative 
dossiers based on policy salience, interests, and expertise. 
The quantitative element of our mixed methods empirical approach analyses data on 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs during the EP’s 2009-14 term. Information on shadow 
rapporteurs was not published on a large scale by the EP prior to 2009 and has not been used 
extensively in research to date. Exceptions are Hurka et al. (2015), who find that MEPs from 
the countries that joined the EU in and after 2004 are under-represented as shadow rapporteurs; 
and Häge and Ringe (2019), whose study of social networks composed of rapporteurs and 
shadow rapporteurs finds that MEPs from small party groups are particularly central and have 
greater potential for brokerage. The quantitative analysis uses a novel dyadic research design 
that allows us to investigate the role of strategic and motivational factors in the shadow 
rapporteur appointment process that have not been the subject of previous research. The 
qualitative element relies on information from interviews with a carefully selected group of EP 
respondents from all but one party group and a large number of standing committees.  
The findings from the analyses of both sets of data complement and confirm each other: 
the assignment of shadow rapporteurships is a bottom-up process based on self-selection, not 
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a top-down delegation process with EP party groups acting as principals and individual MEPs 
as their agents.  
Shadow rapporteur selection: Top-down or bottom-up? 
Unlike the assignment of rapporteurs, the selection of shadow rapporteurs has not received 
systematic attention in previous research, and the factors influencing the allocation of 
rapporteurships are likely not the same as those influencing shadow rapporteur selection. First, 
the stakes in the selection of shadow rapporteurs are likely lower, both in terms of the 
opportunity costs for party group coordinators as they bid for lead rapporteurships and in the 
rewards for individual MEPs who covet the positions. Second, the process in which 
rapporteurships are auctioned off ascribes coordinators a strategic role in competitive inter-
party bargaining, with different incentives and payoffs than the intra-party process of allocating 
shadow rapporteurships. Finally, shadow rapporteurs are chosen only after a report has been 
assigned to another party group, and the identity of the lead rapporteur is usually – but not 
necessarily, according to our respondents – known at that time. This temporal sequence has the 
potential to shape strategic considerations in the selection of shadow rapporteurs. 
Much existing research assumes that ideology and partisanship drive political 
appointments in EP politics, including previous work on the allocation of rapporteurs that 
explicitly or implicitly views that process through the lens of principal-agent theory (e.g., 
Chiou et al., 2019; Hausemer, 2006; Kaeding, 2004; Obholzer et al., 2019; Yordanova, 2011; 
Yoshinaka et al., 2010). This approach is appealing because it is parsimonious, intuitive, and 
in line with the dominant views of EP politics as revolving around strong legislative party 
organisations (see especially Hix et al., 2007; Kreppel, 2002; Yordanova, 2013). In a top-down 
process, leaders of the party group nominate members for these types of positions that, based 
on pre-existing characteristics, promise to best represent the leadership’s interests.  
However, the uncritical application of principal-agent models to these types of 
hierarchical relationships in EU policy-making has also been challenged, because the 
assumptions of these models are a poor reflection of actual decision-making processes in the 
EU institutions (Häge, 2011b; Ringe, 2005). Reasons to be sceptical of a strong principal-agent 
logic in EP politics include the institution’s consensual decision-making culture, the high 
frequency of decisions passed by oversized majorities, and the fact that legislative work is not 
obviously linked to MEPs’ electoral fortunes. Most importantly, however, the notion that the 
principal has pre-existing preferences on specific policy proposals and selects agents on this 
basis is often empirically implausible. This assumption disregards the possibility that the 
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principal’s preferences are, in fact, endogenously shaped by the agent in the policy-making 
process. If the principal’s policy preferences are only developed through the work of the agent, 
however, they cannot play a role in the appointment process.  
Top-down assignment 
From a principal-agent perspective, shadow rapporteurs fulfil a dual function. First, they 
represent their party group in collective decision-making processes of the committee. They 
formulate policy positions and negotiate on their group’s behalf with the rapporteur and their 
counterparts from other groups to arrive at a collective committee decision. Second, they 
monitor the actions of the rapporteur. The tasks delegated by committees to rapporteurs, and 
the prerogatives and role expectations that come with them, put rapporteurs into influential 
positions in the EU’s policy-making process. Rapporteurs may abuse these positions to 
promote their own personal or party political interests, but oversight by shadow rapporteurs 
limits their discretion. However, both of these functions of shadow rapporteurs can themselves 
be seen as being based on an explicit or implicit act of delegation. In the shadow rapporteur 
context, the principal is the party group as a collective actor – likely represented by the 
coordinator as the party group’s leader in the relevant committee – and the agent is the member 
nominated as shadow rapporteur.  
With regard to shadow rapporteurs’ policy formulation function, the delegation logic 
underlying the development of legislative committees applies analogously (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel, 1987). Just like the establishment of legislative committees, appointing shadow 
rapporteurs to deal with different policy proposals is a form of legislative specialisation, except 
that it occurs within the party group rather than the legislature as a whole. According to this 
logic, principals lack policy expertise and are unsure about how policy proposals translate into 
practical outcomes on the ground. In order to make better informed decisions, they delegate 
the policy formulation task to agents. To incentivise agents to accumulate the necessary policy 
expertise, principals grant them a disproportionate amount of policy-making influence. In the 
case of EP policy-making, shadow rapporteurs are largely put in charge of developing specific 
policy proposals for their party group, as well as promoting and defending them in formal and 
informal decision-making arenas.  
However, given the informational asymmetry between principals and agents, agents 
might abuse these prerogatives to pursue policy goals that differ from those of their principals. 
In other words, shadow rapporteurs might exploit their decision-making prerogatives to 
promote their own policy views rather than policies that are in the best interest of their party 
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group. Given that the party group does not know which policy solution is in its best interest, it 
will find it hard to identify and sanction such behaviour. Thus, the most effective way for 
principals to prevent agency drift is to select agents that have similar policy preferences. In the 
context of shadow rapporteurships, the party group leaders – in practise, that is the party group 
coordinators in the EP’s standing committees – are expected to appoint group members as 
shadow rapporteurs that hold policy positions that are representative of the group as a whole. 
The goal and the role of the group coordinator is to minimise agency loss by ensuring that the 
policy position of the person selected as shadow rapporteur does not deviate too far from the 
position of the party group’s median member: 
H1: The closer a party group member’s policy position is to the median position of the party 
group, the more likely that party group member will be appointed as shadow rapporteur. 
It may be the case, however, that the party group leadership is not only concerned with the 
characteristics of its own group members when assigning shadow rapporteurs. Applying a 
higher level of strategic foresight, the party group leadership might also take the interactions 
with the rapporteur and his or her policy positions into account. In this scenario, it is not the 
policy distance of the group member’s position from the group median’s position that matters, 
but the distance of the group member’s position from the position of the rapporteur. Much of 
this argument is based on Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1995) theory of strategic oversight, which 
models the role of interest groups for Congress’ ability to evaluate the actions of executive 
agencies. We can apply this model analogously to the EU law-making process. In the EU 
context, the rapporteur drafts a report on the Commission’s proposal or negotiates an inter-
institutional text with the Council Presidency, the shadow rapporteur recommends support of 
or opposition to the rapporteur’s text to his or her party group, and, on the basis of this 
recommendation, the party group accepts or rejects the rapporteur’s text. While the rapporteur 
and shadow rapporteur have private information about the practical implications of the 
proposed policy provisions, other members of the shadow rapporteur’s party group – including 
its leadership – are more uncertain. For that reason, the party group leadership must be 
concerned about collusion between the rapporteur and shadow rapporteur and be wary of the 
shadow rapporteur’s recommendation.  
However, the likelihood that the shadow rapporteur colludes with the rapporteur 
decreases with increasing distance between their policy positions. Shadow rapporteurs whose 
policy positions diverge from that of the rapporteur have an incentive to scrutinise the work of 
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the rapporteur more carefully and to evaluate the content of the report more critically. All else 
equal, therefore, greater distance between the policy positions of shadow rapporteur and 
rapporteur makes it more likely that the shadow rapporteur will fulfil one of its key 
responsibilities associated with the position: to monitor and serve as a check on the rapporteur. 
Shadow rapporteurs with views that diverge from those of the rapporteur are also more likely 
to push harder for concessions from the rapporteur when participating in rapporteur-shadow 
rapporteur meetings. Such concessions, in turn, move the final policy outcome closer to the 
position of the party group’s median member. Taken together, the incentives to properly 
monitor the rapporteur’s actions and effectively defend the party group’s policy position make 
shadow rapporteurs with a policy position more distant from the policy position of the 
rapporteur more trustworthy representatives and interlocutors.  
Once strategic interactions with the rapporteur are taken into account, a shadow 
rapporteur whose policy position diverges from the rapporteur’s is even more beneficial to the 
party group than one whose position is tightly aligned with the position of the party group 
median. A party group with more strategic foresight should, therefore, select a shadow 
rapporteur with policy positions that diverge as much as possible from those of the rapporteur. 
H2: The more distant a party group member’s policy position is to the rapporteur’s position, 
the more likely that party group member will be appointed as shadow rapporteur. 
Bottom-up self-selection 
It is possible, however, that the assignment of shadow rapporteurs is much less of a top-down 
process than the principal-agent perspective suggests. If the process is more bottom-up and 
MEPs self-select into shadow rapporteurships, they will choose to cover proposals based on 
some combination of policy interests, policy salience, and policy expertise.  
An indicator that policy salience drives self-selection would be that MEPs select to 
become shadow rapporteurs for proposals of particular salience in national politics. Becoming 
engaged in the formulation of polices that have stark implications for nationally important 
economic sectors or receive much attention in national public and political debate may enhance 
MEPs’ public visibility, generate opportunities for credit-claiming, and galvanise the support 
of important interest groups, which in turn should improve MEPs’ reelection chances. 
Independent of their party affiliations, Nordic MEPs may thus be particularly inclined to 
volunteer for fisheries legislation, Mediterranean MEPs for dossiers on tourism, and German 
MEPs for proposals affecting the car industry. Unfortunately, we cannot measure the national 
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salience of individual policy proposals directly. However, if the national salience of policy is 
an important factor in both becoming rapporteur and shadow rapporteur, then the coincidence 
of interests at the dyadic level should result in a high probability of rapporteurs being matched 
by shadow rapporteurs from the same country. 
H3: Party group members with the same national background as the rapporteur are more likely 
to become a shadow rapporteur than party group members with a different national 
background. 
MEPs’ policy interests are also difficult to measure directly, but we can observe the types of 
policy proposals MEPs have been working on as rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs and treat 
the content of these proposals as manifestations of MEPs’ policy specialisms. If policy interests 
have a substantial effect on MEPs’ choices in taking on rapporteurships and shadow 
rapporteurships, then we would expect rapporteurs to be matched with shadow rapporteurs that 
have a report and opinion portfolio that is similar in terms of policy content.  
H4: The more similar a party group member’s policy interests are to the rapporteur’s policy 
interests, the more likely that party group member will become a shadow rapporteur. 
Qualitative analysis 
We conducted ten in-depth, semi-structured interviews in the EP and exchanged several emails 
with one MEP who was not available to meet in person. Our sample was carefully and 
purposefully selected and, therefore, includes respondents from seven (of eight) political 
groups and ten member states who have been or are involved with ten (and thus half) of the 
EP’s standing committees. Among our respondents were MEPs, MEP assistants, party group 
advisors, and members of the EP secretariat. The interviews provide analytical leverage by 
offering insight into the actual practice of assigning shadow rapporteurs and by allowing for 
methodological triangulation. Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative data complement one 
another, such that we can use each to make better sense of the other. 
We received highly consistent responses across interviews, in particular with regard to 
the selection process for shadow rapporteurs, which our respondents described as primarily 
bottom-up.1 Independent of each other and consistently across party groups and committees, 
respondents described a process whereby MEPs in the responsible committee indicate which 
reports they would like to cover and succeed much of the time. One political group advisor, for 
example, describes that ‘it is a bottom up approach, not top down, but it is a matter of self-
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organisation where people turn up to do their job’ (Respondent #3). To start, MEPs indicate at 
the beginning of a new legislative term which policy areas and topics they would generally 
prefer to focus on (#7, 8, 11). Then they ‘come forward to express their interest’ in particular 
reports (# 2), either in response to lists of upcoming reports that are shared in advance (#3; also 
#9, 11, 10) or when they are ‘asked who is interested to become the shadow’ in meetings of 
committee members from the same party group (#10; also #8). On this basis, a decision is made 
in a process that respondents agree is generally collaborative and ‘collegial,’ as one MEP put 
it (#4). A number of different criteria are applied such as  
‘other files [MEPs] are working on to ensure a balance in workload, interest in the 
particular field, expertise in the relevant field, how much they participate in the 
working group – votes, attendance, etc. We try to strike a balance, also 
geographically and across member states’ (#11).  
Other respondents similarly listed some or all of these criteria: relative workload and the 
distribution of other reports (#6, 8, 10); previous level of engagement in legislative activities 
(#2, 3); and the geographic and national makeup of the negotiating team as a whole (#4, 6). 
Concerning the latter, it is notable that respondents explicitly indicated that ‘you don’t want a 
whole group of negotiators who are all from the same country’ (#6, also #11), which limits the 
extent to which members may choose reports based on national priorities and thus casts doubt 
on H3. In line with H4, however, substantive expertise is a major consideration (#3, 6, 8, 10), 
and there are ‘definitely some ‘go to’ people for specific policy areas; for example, somebody 
is the ‘carbon capture guy’’ (#7; also #1, 3, 9). These criteria are not formal rules, however, 
but conventions that reflect best practices (#2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10).  
Another consideration is that everybody who wants to serve as shadow has to be given 
the opportunity at times, to ‘keep people happy’ (#3, 11; also #8) and make sure nobody is 
‘feeling like they are excluded’ (#9, also #6). In other words, it would be seen as a major 
problem if the party group ‘ignore[d] [some] members or favor [others]; everybody has to be 
able to work’ (#11). Ensuring this is one of the responsibilities of party group coordinators. 
They are crucial in coordinating the bottom-up process of shadow rapporteurship allocation 
(#2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11) – in which they are supported by party group advisors (#3, 11) – especially 
when more than one MEP requests a particular shadow rapporteurship and a choice has to be 
made. An MEP from the Greens explained that ‘if there are two or three members who show 
the same interest as well, there is a discussion and normally the coordinator … comes up with 
a proposal, which he checks with the colleagues’ (#10). A major consideration is, again, who 
is covering other reports and ‘what’s in the pipeline’ (#3). And while it is not the case that 
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coordinators simply declare ‘you get that, you get that’ (#8), they can try to steer particular 
reports to specific MEPs. Especially when the report concerns ‘a big legislative file, we make 
sure we get the right person, how efficient a member might be’ (#11). Similarly, ‘if only some 
[committee members] are active and engaged, allocation is based on nature of dossier, but also 
if the coordinator thinks the person will actually work’ (#3). Others concurred, explaining that 
they consider ‘who I would like to have this done by’ (#8) or if somebody is ‘not so good at 
negotiating’ (#10).  
In other words, even though all respondents emphasised the bottom-up dynamic in the 
allocation of shadow rapporteurships, most also acknowledged that coordinators can and do 
influence who is put in charge of a particular report, especially when multiple MEPs explicitly 
request it. None of our respondents maintained, however, that shadow rapporteurs are selected 
in light of their policy positions vis-à-vis the party group median or the rapporteur. Thus, H1 
and H2, about the effects of member’s policy position, found no support. Neither did H3 about 
the role of national salience on the selection of shadow rapporteurs. In contrast, policy interests 
and expertise are most often mentioned as reasons for volunteering or being selected as shadow 
rapporteur, which supports H4. Overall, the interview responses describe the allocation of 
shadow rapporteurships primarily as a process of bottom-up self-selection, and secondarily as 
a top-down coordination process that is principally aimed at ensuring that shadow rapporteurs 
are competent and engaged. 
Quantitative data and methods 
The dataset analysed in this study is based on information about characteristics of co-decision 
reports and MEPs in the EP’s 7th term (2009-2014). Through computer scripts, we downloaded, 
extracted, and merged information from two separate sources on the EP website: the 
‘Legislative Observatory’ and the ‘History of Parliamentary Service’ pages of the directory 
providing MEPs’ biographical information. Our dataset takes a dyadic form, where the two 
dyad members defining a row in the data matrix are the rapporteur and a potential shadow 
rapporteur from another party group. In principle, all full and substitute members of the 
relevant committee at the time of the adoption of a file are potential shadow rapporteurs. 
However, we exclude all non-aligned committee members, who are not a member of a party 
group, and committee members from party groups that did not appoint a shadow rapporteur for 
a particular file. The theoretical expectations derived from principal-agent theory are not 
applicable and the related explanatory variables are not defined for MEPs that are not members 
of a party group.  
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The elimination of dyads including committee members from party groups that did not 
nominate a shadow rapporteur ensures that variation in the party group’s choice of whether to 
nominate a shadow rapporteur is not conflated with variation in the party group’s choice of 
who to nominate. Focusing on this sub-sample is conceptually more appropriate, as our 
theoretical arguments relate to the selection of shadow rapporteurs from a pool of potential 
shadow rapporteurs, not to the decision to appoint or not appoint a shadow rapporteur in the 
first place. Based on these selection criteria, the sample contains 53,522 ‘rapporteur-potential 
shadow rapporteur’ dyads, which make up 2031 choice sets related to 491 co-decision reports. 
Choice sets consist of all members of a particular party group, within a particular committee, 
dealing with a particular report. In other words, they constitute the pool of party group members 
of a committee from which a shadow rapporteur can be selected for a certain report. Our 
quantitative analysis employs a conditional logit model, which uses choice sets as a 
stratification variable. Table 1 indicates how the size of the choice set varies within and across 
party groups. While choice sets can be as small as two MEPs for the smaller party groups, such 
small sets are the exception rather than the rule. Even the smallest party groups were able to 
select on average from three to four MEPs when nominating a shadow rapporteur for a 
particular report.  
Table 1: Choice set size by party group 
Party group Min. Mean Max. 
EPP 15 33.7 68 
S&D 10 23.6 44 
ECR 2 7.1 15 
GREENS 3 7.0 13 
GUE-NGL 2 4.3 10 
ALDE 5 10.0 20 
EFD 2 3.6 6 
Note: The table shows the minimum (min.), mean, and maximum (max.) number of party group members across 
choice sets. The choice set consists of members of a particular party group, within a particular committee, dealing 
with a particular report. The total number of choice sets is 2031. ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe; ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists; EFD: Europe of Freedom and Democracy; EPP: European 
People’s Party; GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left; S&D: Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
The dependent variable in the statistical analysis is a simple binary variable, indicating whether 
(1) or not (0) a committee member was nominated by his or her party group to shadow a 
particular rapporteur. The two explanatory variables testing different versions of the principal-
agent argument relate to ideological differences between the rapporteur, the shadow rapporteur, 
and the party group median. In the absence of exogenous ideology scores for individual MEPs, 
we use data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) about the ideological positions 
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of their national parties (Bakker et al., 2015). In contrast to ideology measures based on EP roll 
call votes, CHES party positions are unlikely to be affected by MEPs’ activities as rapporteurs 
or shadow rapporteurs. Experts of national party systems estimate parties’ positions based 
mainly on their communication and behaviour in domestic politics. Given the small size of 
many national party delegations, these data still provide considerable variation of positions 
within European party groups. Indeed, for the 7th term of the EP, general left-right positions 
based on national party positions show a higher degree of within-party group variation than 
W-Nominate scores for individual MEPs. In addition, at the party group level, the positions 
from the CHES data have better face validity than the positions based on roll call votes, and 
they allow for the consideration of a wider array of conflict dimensions. We compute three 
versions of the position variables, based on different dimensions of party competition often 
identified in existing studies of EU politics (e.g., Hix et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2006): the 
general left-right dimension, the pro-/anti-European integration dimension, and the GAL-TAN 
(Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) dimension.2 
If the party groups’ strategic considerations focus only on the characteristics of its 
members, we would expect party group leaders to select shadow rapporteurs that are 
ideologically close to the party group median. We operationalise this variable as the absolute 
value of the distance between the ideological position of the national party of the potential 
shadow rapporteur and the ideological position of the national party of the party group median. 
If party groups also take the interactions with the rapporteur into account, party group leaders 
are better off selecting shadow rapporteurs with positions that are far away from the position 
of the rapporteur. This variable is operationalised as the absolute value of the distance between 
the ideological position of the national party of the rapporteur and the ideological position of 
the national party of the potential shadow rapporteur.  
The variable measuring joint national background takes a value of 1 if the rapporteur and 
the potential shadow rapporteur come from the same member state and 0 otherwise. The 
variable measuring the similarity of policy interests is based on the subject codes of policy 
proposals. The EP’s legislative observatory assigns each decision-making process one or more 
hierarchically structured policy subject codes. If an MEP was a rapporteur or shadow 
rapporteur for a report or opinion related to a particular policy proposal, the MEP is linked to 
this proposal’s subject codes. The number of times an MEP was linked to each of 372 subject 
codes constitutes the MEP’s subject code profile. The similarity of two MEPs’ policy interests 
is then measured as the correlation between their subject code profiles, which is in turn based 
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on the extent two MEPs acted as rapporteurs and/or shadow rapporteurs for policy proposals 
of similar content.   
To compute the correlation between policy subject code profiles of pairs of MEPs, we 
use the concordance correlation coefficient (Lin, 1989). The concordance correlation 
coefficient can be interpreted as a chance-corrected agreement index for valued data (Häge, 
2011a). It expresses the agreement in policy subject codes covered by MEPs beyond the 
agreement expected based on the marginal distributions of their policy subject code profiles. 
The coefficient adjusts the agreement score for the differential propensity of MEPs to be linked 
to a policy subject, and for the overall low propensity of all MEPs to be linked to any policy 
subject. The former feature makes sure that differences between the dyad members in the total 
number of policy subjects they are linked to is not treated as dissimilarity in terms of policy 
content; the latter feature ensures that the preponderance of the joint absence of links to policy 
subjects is not unduly treated as a form of similarity. In other words, the chance-correction 
ensures that the score of the correlation coefficient reflects similarity in the content of policy 
subject profiles rather than similarity in the frequency of MEPs’ engagement in policy work.  
To alleviate somewhat concerns about the endogeneity of this variable to shadow 
rapporteur appointments, it should be noted that the data basis for the policy interest similarity 
variable is much broader. Whereas the dependent variable focuses on shadow rapporteurships 
for codecision reports only, the policy interest similarity variable is based on rapporteurships 
and shadow rapporteurships for any type of report or opinion, including those for non-
legislative proposals, own-initiative reports, consultation and consent procedure proposals.3 As 
the original policy subject profile variable is highly positively skewed, we transform the profile 
scores to their natural logarithm before computing the concordance correlation coefficients. 
We also include a range of monadic control variables used in previous research. The first 
is seniority, operationalised as the number of terms an MEP has served in the EP. Less senior 
members might be more likely to become shadow rapporteurs, seeing it as a first step on the 
ladder of influential office positions in the EP. Next, the size of the national party delegation 
within the European party group might affect their members’ chances of becoming a shadow 
rapporteur, with larger national parties expected to secure a disproportionally larger share of 
shadow rapporteurships. This variable is operationalised as the share of European party group 
members that are members of the national party delegation. MEPs in committee leadership 
positions are also supposed to be in an advantageous position to obtain desirable 
rapporteurships for themselves. The committee leadership variable indicates whether or not an 
MEP was a committee chair or vice-chair. In contrast, party group leadership positions are 
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supposed to make involvement in committee work less likely. The party group leadership 
variable indicates whether or not an MEP was a member of the bureau of a political group. 
Furthermore, substitute committee members might generally be less likely to get involved in 
committee work than full members. A dummy variable indicating whether or not an MEP was 
a substitute committee member captures this difference. All position and membership variables 
are measured at the point of adoption of the report. In general, MEPs that engage in EP work 
more generally might also be more likely to become shadow rapporteurs. Thus, we include a 
variable for absenteeism, which measures the percentage of roll call votes missed by an MEP. 
As the distribution of the variable is concentrated near its minimum value and has a strong 
positive skew, we transform it by taking the natural logarithm.  
Finally, to focus the analysis of shadow rapporteur selection on its intra-party group 
variation within committees, we employ a conditional logit model to analyse the data. The 
stratification in conditional logit models allows for the incorporation of fixed effects without 
the need to explicitly estimate them. This property of conditional logit models is particularly 
useful in situations like ours, where the inclusion of a large number of dummy variables to 
estimate coefficients for fixed effects would result in estimation problems. Our stratification 
variable indicates a party group within a committee, dealing with a particular report. As a result, 
stratifying the analysis by this variable holds all report, committee, and party group 
characteristics constant. The stratification also adjusts for many of the dependencies caused by 
the multi-level structure of the data. To further investigate whether the effects of explanatory 
variables are heterogeneous across party groups, we do not only report regression results for 
the full sample of dyads, but also for individual party groups.4 This form of analysis allows for 
possible multi-level interactions. In the interpretation of results, we prioritise the results of the 
individual party group analyses, as party groups are the appropriate context in which the 
nomination of shadow rapporteurs occurs. 
Determinants of shadow rapporteur appointment 
Table 2 presents the results of a conditional logistic regression with shadow rapporteur 
appointment for codecision reports as the dichotomous dependent variable. In general, the 
results provide support for the bottom-up self-selection perspective, while evidence for the top-
down delegation perspective is inconsistent and not robust. The model estimates based on the 
full sample of codecision reports produce statistically significant effects for some top-down 
delegation variables, but those turn out to be fragile when the analysis concentrates on sub-
samples of individual party groups.  
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NGL Greens S&D ALDE EPP ECR 
Top-Down        
Distance to Party Group        
Left-Right 0.94 1.11 1.00 1.24 0.70** 0.74 0.99  
(0.05) (0.43) (0.12) (0.30) (0.09) (0.13) (0.36) 
EU Support 0.79*** 1.00 0.72* 0.36*** 1.95*** 0.91 0.43* 
 (0.05) (0.33) (0.11) (0.09) (0.37) (0.16) (0.15) 
GAL/TAN 0.92* 1.11 0.84 1.07 0.89 1.04 0.66* 
 (0.03) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) 
Distance to Rapporteur        
Left-Right 1.07 0.99 1.07 0.77 1.12 0.98 1.13 
 (0.04) (0.32) (0.14) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.18) 
EU Support 1.01 0.67 1.18 1.13 0.99 0.79 0.93 
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.16) (0.23) (0.14) (0.10) (0.27) 
GAL/TAN 0.98 0.81* 1.47* 0.91 1.10 0.98 1.17 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.27) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) 
Bottom-Up        
Similar National  1.01 0.81 1.14 1.21 0.81 1.22 0.97 
Salience (0.10) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.18) (0.29) (0.37) 
Similar Policy Interests 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Control variables        
Seniority 1.01 1.05 1.30** 1.00 0.86 0.93 0.88 
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Committee Leader 0.96 0.76 0.92 0.59* 1.12 1.05 1.23 
 (0.09) (0.55) (0.24) (0.14) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) 
National Delegation  0.91** 1.09 0.83 0.82* 1.13 0.91 0.82 
Size (0.03) (0.27) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) 
Substitute Member 0.62*** 0.67* 0.62** 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.83 0.49*** 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) 
Party Group Leader 0.99 1.07 0.63* 1.11 0.82 1.02 1.96*** 
 (0.07) (0.25) (0.14) (0.36) (0.11) (0.15) (0.33) 
Vote Absenteeism 0.91* 1.20 0.51*** 1.25* 0.92 1.05 1.13 
 (0.04) (0.33) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
AIC 6566.99 523.34 874.09 1371.27 1321.37 1484.11 856.76 
No. of appointment 1854 245 317 273 358 254 308 
No. of observations 23737 1026 2144 6305 3546 8274 2152 
Missings 2735 176 244 667 243 966 310 
Notes: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; the dependent variable indicates the 
appointment of an MEP as shadow rapporteur for a particular codecision report; cell entries present odds ratios 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses; all model specifications include a stratification variable that 
captures the relevant choice set: MEPs of a particular party group in a particular committee being potentially 
appointed as shadow rapporteur for a report the committee is currently dealing with; the sample consists of 
dyads of rapporteurs and potential shadow rapporteurs from other party groups in the same committee. ALDE: 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists; EPP: European 
People’s Party; GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left; S&D: 





Regarding the top-down perspective, the results do not support the idea that the distance in 
positions between the potential shadow rapporteur and the party group median along the left-
right or the GAL/TAN dimension matters in the selection of shadow rapporteurs. Only the 
variable measuring the distance along the pro-/anti-EU dimension shows the expected effect. 
However, the sub-sample analyses of individual party groups indicate that this finding is not 
robust: for three party groups, the effect is not statistically significant, and amongst the other 
three groups, one analysis (ALDE) reports a large statistically significant effect in the opposite 
direction.5 This variation in estimation results across party groups is difficult to reconcile with 
H1. The analyses also provide no support for an effect of ideological distance between the 
rapporteur and the potential shadow rapporteur, regardless of which ideological dimension is 
considered. H2 is thus not supported either. 
With respect to the bottom-up perspective, coming from the same country as the 
rapporteur does not affect the probability of becoming a shadow rapporteur, which contradicts 
H3. Being involved in the formulation of reports with similar policy content as the rapporteur, 
however, has a positive effect on being nominated as shadow rapporteur. In fact, similarity in 
policy interests is the only explanatory variable that retains a consistently strong and 
statistically significant effect across all party group sub-sample analyses. H4 is thus supported 
by the data. As Figure 1 illustrates, keeping all other variables constant, a change from the 5th 
(-2.4) to the 95th percentile (46.9) of the similarity of policy interest variable increases the 
probability of becoming shadow rapporteur from 27% to 89% (i.e. by 62 percentage points). 
The figures of bivariate relationships between shadow rapporteurship appointment and the 
main explanatory variables in the Online appendix demonstrate that these results are not 





Figure 1 Effect of similar policy interests on shadow rapporteur appointment 
Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the full sample model estimates in Table 2. The plot shows the 
change in predicted probabilities in response to changes in the similarity of interest variable, keeping other 
continuous variables constant at their mean. The categorical variables are set to full committee membership, non-
EPG group leader, and different national backgrounds. The strata variable is set to reflect the S&D party group 
choice set (the estimates for the S&D party group are most similar to the full sample results) in the Committee on 
the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety when appointing a shadow rapporteur for a 2013 codecision 
report on a regulation regarding car emissions reductions. The shaded area around the prediction line indicates the 
upper and lower limit of the 95% confidence interval. The rag plot at the bottom shows the relative frequency of 
values of the similarity of policy interests variable. 
The results for the monadic control variables are mostly negative. Seniority and serving as 
committee or party group leader has no effect on shadow rapporteur selection. Estimates based 
on the full model indicate statistically significant results for national party delegation size and 
absenteeism. However, these results are not robust when party groups are analysed separately 
(i.e., in the context in which the nomination of shadow rapporteurs takes place). Only the type 
of committee membership shows a consistent and almost always statistically significant effect 
in the expected direction: not surprisingly, being a substitute rather than a full committee 
member more than halves the odds of becoming a shadow rapporteur.  
Conclusion 
This study sheds light on the selection of shadow rapporteurs, which play an essential and 
influential role in EP policy-making. Existing research on the appointment of MEPs to 
important positions in the EP often takes a top-down principal-agent perspective, assuming that 
the party group leadership selects suitable candidates from among its membership to ensure 
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that the group’s policy positions are adequately represented and defended in intra- and inter-
institutional negotiation processes. We contrast this top-down appointment with a bottom-up 
self-selection process, where taking up influential positions in EP committees is mainly a result 
of the policy motivations of individual MEPs. While it is analytically useful to differentiate 
between the two ideal-typical selection processes, we do not expect that real selection processes 
follow either template in their entirety. The question is not one of either/or, but one of degree. 
The study’s findings from interviews with practitioners indicate that the assignment of 
shadow rapporteurs is largely a bottom-up process in which MEPs volunteer for particular 
reports on the basis of policy interests, and generally receive those reports if nobody else claims 
them. If there is a choice to be made, shadow rapporteurships are assigned in a ‘collegial’ 
process that takes into account factors such as policy expertise, relative workload, overall 
engagement in legislative activities, and a geographic balance in the EP’s negotiating team. 
Party group coordinators play an important coordinating role in this process and help shape 
outcomes; a limited top-down dynamic was thus highlighted in our interviews. Yet, not a single 
respondent mentioned ideological views as a selection criterion. Rather than imposing the 
position of the party group leadership, the role of the party group coordinator seems to be one 
of facilitating coordination and collaboration amongst party group members and ensuring the 
efficient use of group resources. 
This conclusion confirms and complements the findings from our quantitative analyses, 
which found no consistent evidence for an effect of strategic considerations of the party group 
leadership on shadow rapporteurship appointments. Neither the ideological distance between 
party group members and the party group median, nor the ideological distance between party 
group members and the rapporteur are criteria for the selection of shadow rapporteurs, as 
suggested by principal-agent theory. In contrast, the quantitative evidence is consistent with a 
bottom-up self-selection process. Having policy interests similar to those of the rapporteur has 
a strong and robust positive effect on the probability of becoming a shadow rapporteur. This 
observed pattern is a direct implication of the bottom-up argument that engagement in policy-
formulation work within committees is driven by committee members’ policy interests. 
To the extent that policy interests go together with policy expertise, the finding of a 
positive effect of policy interests could also be interpreted as supporting principal-agent theory. 
One of the main reasons for principals to delegate tasks to agents is to take advantage of the 
latter’s higher level of expertise. However, the finding that divergent policy preferences have 
no effect on the nomination of shadow rapporteurs contradicts the core tenet and the very raison 
d'être of principal-agent theory, which problematises the moral hazard created by the divergent 
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views of principals and their agents. Once preference divergence becomes irrelevant, principal-
agent models reduce to simple, non-strategic optimisation models. Principals will then almost 
trivially choose the agent with the highest level of expertise from the pool of available 
candidates. The principal’s choice becomes one of selecting the most competent person for the 
job. Control and monitoring of agent behaviour, which is at the heart of principal-agent theory, 
is not an issue in these situations anymore. In this scenario, the question of why MEPs have 
different levels of policy expertise is of more causal relevance for the selection of shadow 
rapporteurs than the quasi-automatic ‘choice’ by group coordinators. This system of shadow 
rapporteurship allocation might very well induce MEPs to develop expertise in some policy 
area, but given the lack of top-down direction, the choice of which policy area to gain expertise 
in - and thus what type of reports will be allocated to them as a consequence - is primarily a 
function of individual MEPs’ motivations. 
The qualitative findings that group coordinators do not select shadow rapporteurs based 
on their political views but based on their expertise and their general track-record of 
engagement in legislative activities is quite in line with this characterisation of the role of 
‘principals’ in principal-agent models when preference divergence is absent. Furthermore, the 
qualitative findings show that the role of group coordinators is even more circumscribed than 
such a simple optimisation model would suggest. These findings suggest that, in game 
theoretical terms, a model in which group members move first and the group coordinator moves 
second would be a better representation of ‘real world’ selection processes. Group members 
first decide about whether to put themselves forward for a certain report, and then the 
coordinator selects one member from among the pool of volunteers. In this way, the behaviour 
of group members severely restricts the choice set of the group coordinator. In the limiting (but 
empirically common) case where only one member volunteers, the coordinator’s ‘choice’ is 
predetermined, and his or her role is redundant. But even if more than one group member 
volunteers, the coordinator only optimises over the set of candidates that actually put 
themselves forward, not over the entire range of party group members in the committee.  
To conclude, the study results indicate that group coordinators are not a mechanism 
through which the party group leadership controls and monitors rank-and-file members, but 
rather a device to overcome coordination problems amongst group members (the hint is in their 
title). Party group coordinators act as mediators and ultimate arbiters when the generally 
bottom-up process of self-selection into shadow rapporteurships results in conflicting demands 
by group members and requires binding third-party adjudication. In this view, party group 
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coordinators merely facilitate the bottom-up self-selection process, and they play this already 
rather limited role only in those relatively rare instances where such arbitration is required. 
The quantitative analyses also show that shared nationality has no effect on shadow 
rapporteurship appointment, which could mean that policy motivations are more important than 
re-election concerns when it comes to MEPs selecting into shadow rapporteurships. Again, this 
finding is consistent with evidence from the qualitative analysis. Moreover, the qualitative 
analysis adds an important nuance to the finding’s interpretation. It suggests that there are limits 
to self-selection in that party groups strive for a geographic and national balance in the EP’s 
negotiating ‘teams.’ The very fact that geographical balance is mentioned by interviewees as a 
selection criterion suggests that national policy salience is an important motivating factor for 
MEPs to volunteer for shadow rapporteurships, but the consequences of these motivations are 
curbed by group coordinators’ desire to avoid national biases in the policy formulation process. 
While the application of this selection criterion constitutes a form of top-down control, it is not 
well represented by principal-agent theory either. Rather than a desire to prevent moral hazard 
on behalf of the selected group member, this form of coordination across party groups seems 
to be driven by norms of proportionality and representation.     
The study’s general conclusion is that shadow rapporteurships in the EP are assigned in 
what is primarily a bottom-up process of self-selection based on policy interests. The 
appointment of shadow rapporteurs thus differs from the selection of rapporteurs, a process in 
which ideological closeness to the party median or party loyalty have been found to matter. 
Unlike in the allocation of reports, the role of party group coordinators in the selection of 
shadow rapporteurs  is to help coordinate when more than one member requests a report, and 
to ensure that the subgroup of lawmakers to whom the committee delegates policymaking 
authority is not too overtly biased toward particular nationalities. They do not, however, assign 
shadow rapporteurships strategically based on group members’ policy positions (or party 
loyalty).  Concerns over the faithful representation of the party group’s position in the policy 
formulation process, or the effective monitoring of and the extraction of concessions from the 
rapporteur, do not play a role in this selection process.  
Hence, our research not only contributes to a better understanding of how MEPs are 
selected into a particular position of influence in EU law-making, it also adds to a growing 
body of work that cautions against assuming strong party control when it comes to the 
allocation of influential legislative positions in the EP: in addition to our findings about shadow 
rapporteurs, ideological closeness to the party median or party loyalty have been found not to 
be associated with the inclusion and placement of incumbent MEPs on national party lists 
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(Wilson et al., 2016), committee assignments (Whitaker, 2019), or the selection into committee 
leadership positions (Chiru, 2019; Treib and Schlipphak, 2019; Whitaker, 2011), including as 
group coordinator (Daniel and Thierse, 2018). These findings do not negate the important role 
of legislative parties in EP politics, but they call into question the ability or willingness of EP 
party groups – and the national party delegations of which they are composed – to 
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1 Note that it is the process of allocation that is described as similar by our respondents from 
differently sized party groups, not the outcome of that process. Indeed, because of limited 
manpower, members of small party groups have to take on comparatively more reports across 
a broader set of topics. Häge and Ringe (2019) consider the consequences of this variation in 
party group size and find that it impacts the structural positions of MEPs in policy-making 
networks composed of rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. 
2 The Online appendix includes a replication of the analysis with W-Nominate scores to 
measure ideological distances for two ideology dimensions, which provides even clearer 
support for our main conclusions. 
3 In robustness analyses reported in the Online appendix, we further differentiate between the 
data basis for the shadow rapporteur selection variable and the policy interest similarity 
variable by basing the calculation of the latter exclusively on non-codecision files and own-
initiative files, respectively. We also report an analysis that differentiates the two variables 
temporally by relying on MEPs’ links to policy subject codes during the first three years of the 
legislative term to calculate the policy interest similarity variable. This variable is then used to 
predict shadow rapporteur selection during the last two years of the term. 
4 We do not report party group regression results for the Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
(EFD) group. The EFD appointed a comparatively small number of shadow rapporteurs, and 
shadow rapporteurships were highly concentrated in a few party group members. As a result, 
the variability of some explanatory variables is limited, leading to multicollinearity and 
problems with model convergence (i.e. inflated coefficients and standard errors). The full 
sample estimates include EFD members, but their exclusion or inclusion does not substantively 
affect the results.  
5 The entries in Table 2 report odds ratios, so values below 1 indicate negative and values above 
1 indicate positive effects. Note also that the pattern of statistical significance is not related to 
party group size. Thus, the lack of statistical significance in the sub-sample analyses is not 





Bakker R, de Vries C, Edwards E, et al. (2015) Measuring party positions in Europe: The 
Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics 21(1): 143–152. 
Benedetto G (2005) Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: The dynamics of the codecision 
procedure in Europe’s Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy 12(1): 67–88. 
Chiou FY, Hermansen SSL and Høyland B (2019) Delegation of committee reports in the 
European Parliament. European Union Politics (online first): DOI: 
10.1177/1465116519894059. 
Chiru M (2019) Loyal soldiers or seasoned leaders? The selection of committee chairs in the 
European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy (online first). Taylor & Francis: 
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1600573. 
Corbett R, Jacobs F and Shackleton M (2011) The European Parliament. London: John Harper 
Publishing. 
Costello R and Thomson R (2011) The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on 
decision outcomes in the European Union. European Union Politics 12(3): 337–357. 
Daniel WT (2015) Career Behaviour and the European Parliament. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Daniel WT and Thierse S (2018) Individual Determinants for the Selection of Group 
Coordinators in the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies 56(4): 939–
954. 
Epstein D and O’Halloran S (1995) A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and 
the Bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(2): 227–255. 
Gilligan TW and Krehbiel K (1987) Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An 
Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 3(2): 287–335. 
Häge FM (2011a) Choice or circumstance? Adjusting measures of foreign policy similarity for 
chance agreement. Political Analysis 19(3): 287–305. 
Häge FM (2011b) Politicising Council decision-making: The effect of European Parliament 
empowerment. West European Politics 34(1): 18–47. 
Häge FM and Ringe N (2019) Rapporteur-shadow rapporteur networks in the European 




Hausemer P (2006) Participation and political competition in committee report allocation: 
Under what conditions do MEPs represent their constituents? European Union Politics 
7(4): 505–530. 
Hermansen SSL (2018) (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European 
Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies 24(1). Taylor & Francis: 148–172. 
Hix S, Noury A and Roland G (2006) Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament. 
American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 494–520. 
Hix S, Noury A and Roland G (2007) Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoyland B (2006) Allocation of codecision reports in the fifth European Parliament. European 
Union Politics 7(1): 30–50. 
Hurka S, Kaeding M and Obholzer L (2015) Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the 
Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 53(6): 1230–1247. 
Jensen T and Winzen T (2012) Legislative negotiations in the European Parliament. European 
Union Politics 13(1): 118–149. 
Judge D and Earnshaw D (2011) Relais actors and co-decision first reading agreements in the 
European Parliament: The case of the advanced therapies regulation. Journal of European 
Public Policy 18(1): 53–71. 
Kaeding M (2004) Rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament: Information or 
distribution? European Union Politics 5(3): 353–371. 
Kaeding M (2005) The world of committee reports: rapporteurship assignment in the European 
Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies 11(1): 82–104. 
Kreppel A (2002a) The EP and Supranational Party System. Cambridge: Campus. 
Kreppel A (2002b) The EP and Supranational Party System. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lin LI (1989) A Concordance Correlation Coefficient to Evaluate Reproducibility. Biometrics 
45(1): 255–268. 
Mamadouh V and Raunio T (2003) The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report 
Allocation. Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2): 333–351. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1468-5965.00425. 
Marks G, Hooghe L, Nelson M, et al. (2006) Party Competition and European Integration in 




Obholzer L, Hurka S and Kaeding M (2019) Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: 
Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation. 
European Union Politics 20(2): 239–260. 
Ringe N (2005) Policy preference formation in legislative politics: Structures, actors, and focal 
points. American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 731–745. 
Ringe N (2010) Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the 
European Parliament. Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy 
Choice in the European Parliament. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ripoll Servent A and Panning L (2019) Preparatory Bodies as Mediators of Political Conflict 
in Trilogues: The European Parliament’s Shadows Meetings. Politics and Governance 
7(3): 303–315. 
Roederer-Rynning C and Greenwood J (2015) The culture of trilogues. Journal of European 
Public Policy 22(8): 1148–1165. 
Treib O and Schlipphak B (2019) Who gets committee leadership positions in the European 
Parliament? Evidence from the 2014 selection process. European Union Politics. 
Whitaker R (2011) The European Parliament’s Committees: National Party Influence and 
Legislative Empowerment. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Whitaker R (2019) A Case of ‘You Can Always Get What You Want’? Committee 
Assignments in the European Parliament. Parliamentary Affairs 72(1): 162–181. 
Wilson SL, Ringe N and van Thomme J (2016) Policy leadership and re-election in the 
European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy 23(8). Taylor & Francis: 1158–
1179. 
Yordanova N (2011) Inter-institutional rules and division of power in the European Parliament: 
Allocation of consultation and co-decision reports. West European Politics 34(1): 97–121. 
Yordanova N (2013) Organising the European Parliament. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Yoshinaka A, McElroy G and Bowler S (2010) The appointment of rapporteurs in the European 
parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly 35(4): 457–486. 
 
 
